As problems on energy supply get worse, renewable energy technologies are highlighted as alternatives. However conflicts in renewable energy facility siting hinder the promotion of the technologies. Suggesting measures preventing conflicts, however the degree of public acceptance of RE promotion varies considerably in Germany and Korea. It can be assumed that the two countries hold differing institutions and consequently institutional learning which affects changes of behaviors' incentive structure and their preference works differently. To verify it, this study conducts a comparative analysis based on a theoretical framework of Rational Choice Institutionalism. Throughout Institutional Analysis and Development Framework it particularly analyzes how property right and transaction cost, main components of institutions, are recognized in the both countries and how institutional learning and its outcomes are going on. However it does not mean that RE technologies don't have any kinds of negative impact. The RE sources are environmentally friendly energy sources;
Ⅰ. Introduction
World faces energy crisis today: conventional energy sources such as oil, coal and natural gas have finite deposits and also result in global warming; and nuclear energy has risk of serious accidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima, and problem of permanent radioactive waste disposal. Thus most of international organizations as well as states recognize that renewable energy (hereinafter RE) source -solar energy, wind energy, biomass etc. -is a key contributor to the solution of climate change and energy crisis. 1) However it does not mean that RE technologies don't have any kinds of negative impact. The RE sources are environmentally friendly energy sources; however, we are confronted with critical situations. The more RE facilities are built, the more environmental and social conflicts occur. These conflicts may block the continuous RE deployment. Despite of the goal to spur the use of the RE sources, especially it is hard to find a site for the RE facility.
This study aims to find reasons why the conflicts in RE facility siting occur.
For more detailed this research examines: (1) which conflicts occur in RE facility siting; (2) how property right is guaranteed and how much it affects transaction cost; and (3) which institutional learning and its outcomes happen in both countries. To reach the research purpose it compares the Korea's case with the German one: both countries having similar condition political priority of energy security stemming from poor energy resource and heavy dependency on the 'high energy intensity' manufacturing industry but totally different course of the renewable energy promotion.
In the following chapter which conflicts in facility siting are occurring will be summarized. The third chapter theoretical and methodological framework will be introduced, and then the case studies and their findings will be dealt. With the limitation of this research the fifth chapter concludes the study.
Ⅱ. Conflicts in RE facility siting
Problems around RE facilities can be summarized with (1) environmental problems and (2) social conflicts.
Environmental problems from RE facilities reveal in the ExternE study 2) conducted by the EU level. The study which analyzed the external cost of energy facilities also measured the impact of RE to the environment. Land use problems from PV power plants, noise impacts, visual intrusion, impacts on animals, epileptic fits and electromagnetic interference from wind turbines and traffic noise, potential nutrients loss, cultivation and human health effects of ash from biomass plants are representative examples. 3) Tucker et al.(2008) said that the RE facilities have significant impacts on environment, particularly as a result of land take, disturbance and the accidental killing of some species. 4) One research project focusing on the environmental impacts of on-shore wind farms concludes that poorly sited wind farms and turbines can damage habitats and fauna. They also cause habitat loss, habitat degradation, disturbance during construction and operation, and fatalities caused by collisions of vulnerable bird and bat species with turbines. 5)
2) ExternE is the well-known acronym for "External Costs of Energy" and a synonym for a series of projects starting from early 90s till 2005. See the official website http://www.externe.info/externe_d7/ 3) Krewitt, Wolfram et al., 1997, ExternE National Implementation Germany; Krewitt, Wolfram and Schlomann, Barbara, 2006 Recently it is a trend for projects to get bigger based on the concept of economy of scale. The most serious environmental problem and the most well-known to the public is the palm oil plantations in the rain forest region. The UN pointed out that the expansion of cultivation in East Asia had been associated with widespread deforestation and violation of human rights of indigenous people due to the palm oil plantations 6) .
PV power plants planned with the economy of scale sometimes have cut not only trees on mountains, but also mountains themselves. In Korea it is not hard to see cut mountains for the PV power plants. One research has pointed out that PV power plants which can reduce the GHGs emission generates more CO2 since trees had to be cut to build the PV power plants 7) .
The environmental problems lead people's resistance. In parallel with the expansion of RE facilities organizations or initiatives against renewable projects appear and they raise their opinion. In Germany, for example, many anti-wind power organizations were established. In spite of the widespread public support, individual RE projects continue to encounter the acceptance problem and consequently resistance by citizen groups. 13) 11) See; Tucker et al., 2008; KEI, 2009, 3; Bowyer et al., 2009; Heiskanen, E. et al,. 2006 Heiskanen, et al.: 23. |246| 환경법과 정책 제13권(2014.9.30) The success of a certain project matters to the stakeholders, like the developer, the investors, the landowners and the community. 14) Since the late of 1990s where the RE facilities started to be built widely many of scholars began to research on these phenomena. 15) As measures for preventing conflicts, studies conclude: (1) sufficient information offer; (2) guarantee of local inhabitants' participation during the process; and (3) sufficient compensation recovering cost-benefit inequality. In spite of suggesting measures, however, the degree of public acceptance on RE facilities varies from country to country. While in Germany more than 80% of people support RE promotion and RE capacity is continuously increased, in Korea it sees that the lack of public acceptance hinders the promotion of RE power plants. 16) 
Ⅲ. Rational Choice Institutionalism and Analytical Framework
Seeing the conflicts around RE facility siting as crash of involved actors' preferences, rational choice institutionalism (hereinafter RCI) has much more explanatory power than other theories since RCI focuses on the rational individuals seeking their utility maximization in order to explain the origins, the effectiveness, and the stability or the change of institutions. 17) Due to this reason, RCI is applied as a theoretical analytical tool for this study. The comparative analysis is undertaken throughout the perception of property right and transaction cost, formation of policy preferences and institutional learning in Korea and Germany. 14) Lowenstein, J. 2011 Krewitt et al., 1997; Krewitt & Schlomann, 2006; Tucker et al., 2008; KEI, 2009, 3; Bowyer et al., 2009. 16) 
Conflicts, Preferences, Rational Choice Institutionalism
The RE sources are generally noticed as environmentally friendly-and decentralized energy sources; however, it is confronted with direct critical situations from local inhabitants and communities. They complain of noise, traffic, impacts on animals, visual intrusion and so on. Social conflict can be defined as struggle among actors directly involved like project developers, local inhabitants, civil societies and approval authorities.
Hocker and Wilmot defined conflict as "an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce resources, and interference from the other party in achieving their goals." 18) Retzinger and Scheff categorized conflicts as the realist approach that conflict involves material interests and the rationalist approach that conflict is the outcome of conscious intentions. 19) In terms of conflicts in facility siting, Mazmanian and Morell pointed out that cost-benefit inequality, environmental concerns of local inhabitants, risks of new technologies and distrust of authorities/project developers lead to conflicts among stakeholder. 20) Each actor may make these conflict causes to reach its goals, so it can be said that the conflict, at least limited to facility siting conflict, is a struggle of individual's preferences.
To grasp each actor's goal, in other words, to get individual's preferences, each actor performs rationally. 21) However combing each individual's rationalities, then collective action dilemma happens, which means that the outcome might not be rational. Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) begins with this point. Institution is a concept appearing as a solution for the dilemma. North said that institution is a game rule and also humanly devised constraint which is formulating interaction 18) Hocker, Joyce and William Wilmot, 1985, Interpersonal Conflict, 2nd ed. rev Weingast revealed that institutions "constraint the sequence of interaction among actors, the choices available to particular actors, the structure of information and hence beliefs of the actors, and payoffs to individuals and groups." 25) It means that institutional approach to analyze conflicts in facility siting can be worthwhile since it can explain the change of actor's behavior and preferences.
Property Right and Transaction Cost
Property right and transaction cost are main components of institution, which directly influence formation of economic incentives that actors require to play in a certain institution. The economic institutions, interacting with political institutions, impact on the efficiency of a state. 26) Property right means not a relation between human-being and things, but a behavior relationship which is compelled by relation among human-beings brought on thing itself, its acquisition, use and transfer. 27) Generally property right is 22) North, Douglass C., 1990 Since property rights can be seen as rules or norms to restrict deviant behaviors, people can concrete their economic benefit expected if they live in where private property right has taken root well. In this regard, the property right provides a series of interacting models which contributes to the dissolution of conflicts. 29) Furthermore, Alston and Müller (2005) pointed out that the set of property rights is the most important institution of a society for economic growth. 30) Siting and installing RE facilities bring value changes of properties. One hand, local inhabitants owning the planned sites or receiving benefits from the sites will lose their current profit, but they are getting another form of property: rent or sale money. However after installing RE facilities they will face negative impact of external cost on environmental problem such as noise, scenery change or danger of accident. On the other hand, project developers invest money into securing the site and expect profit from the RE facilities.
During the value change of properties the question of how fairly the property rights of all actors are guaranteed is very important, especially from the view of social conflicts and as a result, public acceptance. Lee, 2002: 87. 35) North, 1990 Ha, 2002: 341. 41) Ostrom, E., et al., 1994, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Ostrom, E., et al., 1994: 37. 43) Ostrom, E., et al., 1994 .
Ⅳ. Cast studies in Germany and Korea and Findings
This study aims to find a point why the measures the conducted studies already suggested do not work in Korea while they are coming into action and successfully have increased public acceptance in Germany. For that, this study begins with analysis of reasons and contents of conflicts which occur during site decision process in Korea and Germany.
Case Studies
From the literature review on conflicts in RE facility siting it was done to categorize problems and conflicts raised by actors involved. Total 12 case studies from 6 researches were reanalyzed. 44) The subjects of this analysis are (1) the contents of conflicts; (2) stakeholders/actors; (3) the recommendation these researches suggested.
The cases are: according to the region, 6 cases in Germany and 6 cases in Korea; in the applying technologies, 11 cases with wind turbines and 1 case using biogas plant; in terms of completion, 5 projects were successful while the other 7 projects were canceled or not completed.
Since environmental problems and social conflicts were various from the designing stage to the implementing of the projects, this research made a category of the conflicts so that the property right and the relevant transaction costs can be measured. The subject projects and the contents of the category of the conflicts are shown in the following table. On the other hand, Korea has lack of lower perception on the property right.
Frequent use of the expropriation scheme for development projects result in the anxiety that the opponents may lose their property with very lower value. The EIA degenerating as just red-tape loses confidence from local inhabitants. Also there is a dominant attributes of community that public interests are prior to individuals' property right. Once opposing certain development projects, the collective actions are easily denounced as NIMBY. |256| 환경법과 정책 제13권(2014.9.30) These striking differences make the transaction costs in each country unlike.
In Germany, Renewable Energy Act (EEG) has created a very stable market for RE project transaction. Approval Authorities are working with consistent policy execution to secure actors' property right. Some regulations such as wind park priority area scheme and very strong EIA blockade against conflicts in advance.
Furthermore consistent researches and institutional review are conducted to minimize the transaction cost. As a result, local inhabitants derive benefits from the low transaction cost thanks to high trust of policy. Despite of high information cost, project developers take advantage of low cost for searching proposed sites and contacting local inhabitants.
On the contrary, in Korea, due to the non-consistent policy execution the local inhabitants distrust the approval authorities. Also the recent tendency of the deregulation has been pushing the agreement of residents minimized. Local inhabitants have to pay the high transaction cost to get skills/information to keep its property right. Project developers may enjoy the low information cost and low implementing cost in advance, but once resist from local people raised, massive administrative costs for compensation or private security are delegated to them.
Actors' institutional learning in the both country, of course, works differently.
As mentioned above, stable market, rigid protection of property right, approval authorities as fair judges result in the low transaction cost in Germany. Under the condition with low transaction cost, the huge demand to transact the production of RE facilities is generated. As a result of institutional learning, the concept of citizen power plant (Bürgerkraftwerk) was created and developed. The amendment of the tax law (Jahressteuergesetz) in 2008 which the local administrations get 70% of business tax from RE facilities has been accelerating the explosive RE facility deployment.
However, in Korea unstable property right protection and high transaction cost make an environment which the interest conflict among actors easily happens.
Local Inhabitants often attempt collective actions or opportunism to secure higher property. This is a result from the institutional practices of yesteryear which heavily depended on compensation strategy. This can be said an embodiment of the path dependency. Project developers also make use of opportunism. They tend to provide local people with limited information to prevent conflicts in advance and to use unallowable ways to get inhabitants' consents like manipulation of documents.
Finally the achievement of the policy's goal in the both is strikingly different.
In Germany, the promotion of RE facilities is very successful policy tool for such as GHG emission reduction, energy self-reliance increase, actors' economic profit, job creations, tax revenue security in siting areas and so on. Throughout the very strong public acceptance of more than 80% of Garman supporting RE expansion as of 2013 more than 25% of electricity came from RE and the German government expects its 80% from RE by 2050.
However, Korea still fights a hard battle. Advantages of RE facilities are not magnified. Most of people perceive that RE projects are similar as other construction projects bringing environmental-and social problems and finally benefit-cost inequality. Since the demand for RE facilities has not been generated, deadweight loss occurs. It's a vicious spiral: low public acceptance on RE; and then low deployment; less than 2% of electricity from RE; and low RE promotion target in the long term energy plan.
Ⅴ. Conclusion and Limitation of the study
This comparative research examined whether institutions are results from interaction of various preferences, and analyzed and verified which implication is brought throughout RCI which mainly focuses on property right and transaction cost.
Researches based on RCI analysis framework examine that: there is no guarantee that the policy does not put into action as the state intended; and the achievement of policy goal depends on change of actors' behavior incentive structure and change of their preference rather than the amount of resource and manpower provided by the state. 46) Thus, reaching the policy target to prevent the conflict 46) Lee, 2002: 99. and to increase the public acceptance during the RE promotion, it is needed to provide the institutional strategy which attracts the behavior incentive structure and the preference change from the actors. The implication of this research is to verify this proposition.
The analysis based on the institutionalism poses some questions to the existing theories dealing with coping with policy non-compliance and securing of policy compliance. The existing theories explain that moral persuasion, economic compensation and coercive measures can secure the policy compliance. However this research based on institutionalism verifies that policy design taking into account the property right and the transaction cost and successful inducement of the institutional learning are more important factors.
It is always anticipated that the policy non-compliance happens since any policy results in benefited and damaged groups. The institutionalism theory reveals that policy compliance is secured at the policy design phase rather than the policy implementation. As a result, in principle, policy cost required to reach the policy goal can be saved. In other words, better policy design contributes not only to the economy of the policy cost, but also securing policy compliance before conflicts happen. 47) This research did not include external condition's change and influence of political power relation which is formulated at the policy design phase. For example, trials of strength among relevant actors on the nuclear energy technology, energy policy change after the Fukushima accident, appearance of strong leadership politicians are not dealt in this research.
In addition this research has the intrinsic limitation that other institutionalism studies do. Namely, empirical analysis with quantitative methods is needed to increase the theoretical preciseness and accuracy. Empirical analysis examines whether researchers' subjective prejudice has influenced a research setting and finally can overcome the research limitation. 48) 
